Textures of Thought: Theatricality, Performativity, and the Extended/Enactive Debate Teemu Paavolainen While relatively recent, the 'cognitive turn' in theatre and performance studies has engaged a growing community of scholars who are now looking to the sciences of the mind for no less than a paradigm shift.
vironmentally embedded.' Drawing on widely divergent disciplines, from biology to robotics, both approaches portray mind as an ongoing process interweaving body, brain, and the larger environment, its 'correlates' being thus fundamentally ecological rather than exclusively neural or intracranial. (It should be noted that this shift from strictly internal to more external ontologies of mind reflects a long-held tension in acting practice and training, between the simplified positions of acting from the inside-out or from the outside-in.) Rather than favour one over the other, I maintain that the theories of enaction and extension may fruitfully befit different discussions, but also that they articulate a stronger form of cognitive contexture than do the more neutrally local/global variants of embodiment and its environmental embeddingindeed, rather than conflate these approaches into one church, we would better remain sensitive to implicit conflicts in how they configure the roles of action and perception, agent(s) and environment(s). 4 However, it can be argued that all four strands of '4E cognition' bespeak a fundamentally ecological ontology: why restrict cognition only to its neural 'backstage' in some inner 'theatre of the mind,' when effectively all the world's a stage for the embodied/embedded/extended processes of enaction in which it is performed?
Here we are already in the time-honoured domain of the theatrical metaphor, differently configured in different aesthetic, academic, and everyday contexts. Crucially, neither theatricality nor performativity need be restricted to their cognate art forms: in cognitive-ecological terms, to recapitulate, I specifically intend them as intertwining practices or qualities of making sense, identity, and meaning. Metaphorically, both concepts have been applied to discuss more abstract phenomena of social and cultural existence, yet both also remain abstract enough to depend on even more basic metaphors themselves, according to the context and purpose of their varying definitions. While their etymologies would suggest a vague distinction between seeing and doing -from the Greek theâsthai, 'to behold,' and the Old French parfornir, 'to do, carry out, finish, accomplish' -both discourses also fluctuate between conflicting values of novelty and normativity: in the case of theatricality, between the essence of an art form and a more evasive cultural quality itself regarded in the affirmative or in the pejorative (hence the 'anti-theatrical prejudice'); in the case of performativity, between doing and its dissimulation -the heroic extraversion of Performance Studies and the docile incorporation of social discipline as per Judith Butler. However, the reciprocity of perception and action that notions of cognitive ecology invariably postulate would suggest that we need to understand this set of tensions as fundamentally interdependent to begin with.
Not that the E-words themselves are any news to cognitive theatre and performance scholarship. On the more enactive front, John Lutterbie has developed a 'general theory of acting' explicitly informed by dynamic systems theory, while Phillip Zarrilli has applied Alva Noë's sensorimotor version to actor training, not from the 'outside' position of 'representational or mimetic theories of acting,' but rather 'from the perspective of the actor as enactor/doer from 'inside' the act of performing.' 5 On the 'extended' side, Evelyn Tribble has studied the historical practices and environments of Renaissance theatre 'at a range of levels' distributed across an 'uneven triad of insides, objects, and people' -internal mechanisms, material conditions, and social structures -while I myself have drawn on aspects of both discourses in a study of three emblematic scenographies of the historical avant-garde. 6 The strengths and shortcomings of this work aside, 7 the brief examples I present in this chapter are not drawn from the world of theatre as much as they are from well-known (if indeed somewhat theatrical) experiments in the cognitive sciences, highlighting the themes of change, attention, and appearance that also recur in my reflections on performativity and theatricality. Applied to such admittedly abstract qualities, theories of cognitive ecology allow us to be rather more specific as to how 'the world's a stage' for our collective (cognitive) performances; conversely, these more humanistic idioms may provide historical depth to strictly cognitive conceptions of meaning, sense, and identity, bringing to the fore neglected dynamics and inherent paradoxes not infrequently verging on the political. fields claim the ability to analyze all magnitudes of living existence, be it as a dynamic of play and ritual from animal behaviour to public politics, or as one of 'autonomy' and 'emergence' from single-cell organisms to encompassing ecosystems.
Turning from Schechner to the philosopher and critical theorist Judith Butler, however, the one key premise on which the concepts of enaction and performativity also converge explicitly is in renouncing pregiven essences for acts of 'bringing forth' -no longer in the business of just expressing or revealing pre-existing worlds, minds, or identities, but precisely enacting, performing, or indeed constituting them from moment to moment. Certainly, there is a difference in nuance and domain with regard to just what constitutes such 'constitution':
In the classical phenomenological sense of the enactive paradigm, the term refers to the world's disclosure to awareness in acts of intentional consciousness. 12 Arguably, however, a performative dynamic is well in place before the emergence of any cognitive domain. What I mean is exemplified by Thelen and Smith's dynamic-systems experiments in infant development, in which they found that a 'reflex stepping action seen to disappear at about two months can be restored by holding the baby upright in water.' That the otherwise non-stepping baby will step under water shows that the reflex itself, assumedly lost, is 'clearly in place even while other factors (such as leg mass) prevent its expression under ecologically normal conditions.' With little agency or stepping-relevant cognition on the infant's part, that is, the capacity that here emerges is courtesy of the temporary performative system composed of baby, adult, and bathtub. Finally, some potentially fruitful discrepancies might also be found by comparing how the two approaches conceive of normativity and precariousness. If performativity for Butler 'consists in a reiteration of norms which precede, constrain, and exceed … the performer's "will" or "choice"' 35 and perhaps make her very life precarious, the inherent normativity of an enactive system is precisely a measure of its own flourishing as it 'actively generates and sustains its identity under precarious conditions.' 36 Admittedly, Froese and Di Paolo have lately engaged in intriguing theoretical work to extend enactive principles to the social domain, 'taking on an autonomous organization' of its own while guided by a normativity 'highly underdetermined by metabolic values.' In short, they present 'the heteronomy of culture' as yet 'another discontinuity in the system of discontinuities which constitutes life, mind, and sociality.' 37 Arguably, however, the enactive approach still lacks the tools for properly engaging the more top-down processes of the political, mirroring perhaps the bottom-up influence of biological autonomy and of the 'cognitive unconscious' that Thompson contends 'cannot be made experientially accessible.'
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Hence the more performatively oriented questions of how the apparently 'natural' or 'pregiven' may work to occlude, conceal, or 'dissimulate' its enactive/performative constitution; and how subjects may 'actively partake in their own subjection,' sustained as they are by lines of power and knowledge which they themselves recursively sustain and 'literally incorporate,' yet which they must also deny in order to assert themselves as subjects. with no world yet present to serve as its own best model, we 'let a real, physical model serve as its own best world.' Insofar as 'the need for [such] situational surrogacy increases with the sensory ineffability' of what one is trying to fathom, it is well evidenced in 'the sheer wealth of material culture' associated with religion, science, or indeed the theatre, trading the ephemeral for the kinds of 'online' cognition that we are intuitively good at according to connectionist doctrine: recognising patterns, modeling simple dynamics, manipulating objects. 61 In fact, I am inclined to also include in this 'ephemeral' category the recessive nature of enactive cognition (the path walked down), presupposed by the extended mise-en-mind as its makeshift components stand in for the brought-forth. Staples of the theatrical, political estrangement and melodramatic excess alike can only reference norms already enacted or performed in the world, now made explicit in antagonism and stereotype.
And here we have inconspicuously shifted camps, from the anti-to the pro-theatrical, reflecting the 'major reversal' in its appreciation that Postlewait and Davis situate in aesthetic modernism -not least with the historical emergence of the professional theatre director, now 'making a virtue of the mimetic gap' previously held so suspect. 62 In Marvin Carlson's affirmative prose, this is a view of theatricality not 'as a pale, inadequate, or artificially abstract copy of the life process' but 'as a heightened celebration of that process and its possibilities.'
Moreover, such a view may proudly 'admit to all those qualities that have historically been cited against it -that it is artificial, removed from everyday life, exaggerated, extreme, flamboyant, distracting.' Longman, 1972) . With implications forward and back in the present discussion, the definition continues: 'It invariably emphasizes the visual senses and moves the beholder to become aware of his/her act of spectating. Because this mode of perception depends on the recognition of pre-existing patterns and conventions, it is often framed or, pejoratively spoken, marred by a sense of second-handedness' (Balme, Pacific Performances, 6) . 65 Rowlands, 'Enactivism and the Extended Mind,' 53.
elements of a scene that were previously too "unmarked"' (incidentally, the title of Peggy
Phelan's influential book on performativity). 66 As for this sense of focus, finally, surrogate situations provide a theatrical 'halfway house between fully offline' thought and the more time-constrained, densely-coupled performances of everyday life, by the dual means of temporal relaxation and selective concretisation -that is, latitude in timing and the abstraction or idealisation of content by omitting the extraneous. As any financially-pressured theatre company will know, 'commitment to maximal detail and realism … may prove counterproductive.' This is all in agreement with the tropes of distance, duality, and detachment apropos of theatricality, defamiliarising the performative by operations of decoupling and decontextualisation, yet only deemed 'theatrical' in degrees -from the merest 'outside' perspective of the novice to a sense of excess and contrivance as such 'cuts' abound. (As Simons and Levin note, age was also a factor in their experiment, with peers less easily fooled than older participants just encoding 'some student asking directions.' 70 ) With its vexed dynamic of insight and illusion, however, now intuitive and now inhibiting, any 'logic' of theatricality can only ever appear as one of principled disparity: if taken by a scene which, were it to unfold in a theatre, we would scarcely act upon, its theatrical affordances may (or may not) affect our thought and action nonetheless.
Cognitive Ecology: Textures of Thought?
So in a sense we are back at the question of magnitude, regarding the cultural and biological conceptions of cognitive ecology that the notions of extension and enaction appear to imply.
In terms of how they specify the very relationship between agents and environments, their core commitments are effectively to functional heteronomy and systemic autonomy, multiple realisability and 'compositional plasticity' -by which Thompson Even if only an evocative list of words, these notions of movement, metabolism, and manipulation do begin to suggest how the ephemeral excesses of theatricality may profitably parasitise the more enduring ecologies of performative evolution. If we intend metaphor not as mere figures of speech -theatrical in the sense of embellishing or reflecting some preexisting reality -but instead as deeply performative in the sense of creating the very textures of thought we take to be real, then the very possibility of change lay in attending to what our metaphors serve to hide or highlight, instead of merely reiterating those we are accustomed to live and act by. 79 As notions of mind as 'extended' or 'enactive' are ultimately metaphorical, in themselves, the final move I would like to propose is that the different strands of action, perception, and ecology discussed might be productively interwoven by the more general dramaturgical metaphor of texture.
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In such terms, if 'cognitive ecology is the study of cognitive phenomena in context,' 81 interweaving body, brain, and world, rather than an object that one could neatly localise in some privileged part of its ongoing texture. 82 So let me try to recap how my target concepts appear, as textures of thought within wider cognitive ecologies. If performative textures are typically enacted over time and depend on further histories of sensorimotor experience, then more theatrical ones may recruit external scaffolding opportunistically assembled on the fly, relativising the role of embodied agency by drawing on whatever strands of context are available, cutting some and compressing others. If one moment of such cognitive texture is deemed performative by cycles of continuity and change (from circular causation to restored behaviour) it is the deviant density or sparsity of another that frames or qualifies it as theatrical -yet both only emerge in the weave of absorption and attention, immersion and intervention. That both terms still have analytical purchase is due to a key qualitative difference in their magnitude: where the performative tends to evade consciousness, the theatrical is precisely intuited as such and may indeed heighten our sensitivity to its performative constitution. 83 If the paradox of performativity consists in its naming the eventness of apparent objects and essences while simultaneously dissimulating it, then that of theatricality consists in rendering this eventness perceptible precisely by reducing it to manageable objects -by collapsing, into synoptic space, some texture of trajectories interwoven over performative time. Apart from my attempts in this article, evidence to the effect of these specific idioms weaving into one another in roughly these ways is provided by the previous work that has systematically drawn on versions of the enactive, in discussing specifically embodied practices of performing, 84 and on the extended, for more distributed kinds of theatrical dynamics.
